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VOTER RELIANCE ON FEASIBILITY REPORTS IN
PUBLIC BOND ELECTIONS: TOOKER v. BART
Campaign promises-what are they? The average citizen has
learned to take pre-election promises with the proverbial "grain of
salt." He realizes that such promises are often beyond the power of
the campaigner to fulfill. Campaign promises are often recognized as
empty rhetoric; the result of a pre-ordained ritual acted out before
each election. The disgruntled voter's only recourse is to simply store
away the memory of an unfulfilled promise and wait for his retribution
at the next election.
There is one type of election, however, in which the average voter
would seem to be justified in feeling that his vote is determinative in
that it actually grants or denies public officials the authority to do or
not to do a specific act. In these elections, the voter is asked to ap-
prove or disapprove the issuance of bonds to finance a needed public
improvement. The improvement may take the form of a school, a
new road, a sewage treatment plant, a rapid transit system, or any oth-
er purpose in a myriad of possibilities. The campaign which precedes
a bond election usually includes some publicity which describes the
purpose of the bond issue and why it is necessary to incur a public in-
debtedness to achieve that purpose. Acting in reliance upon this in-
formation, often disseminated by public officials, the citizen exercises
his right to vote assuming that the purpose for which he is authorizing
the public debt is well defined and not subject to change.1
This note will show that this assumption is rarely justified and
that some changes in public bond law are desirable if confidence in
public improvement bonds is not to be undermined. The recent case
of Tooker v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District2 drama-
tizes the extent, to which the public can be misled, within the bounds of
current law, and serves as a convenient focus for this discussion. In
Tooker the court allowed the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit
District3 to eliminate plans for an eight-tenths of a mile subway route
1. "It is the policy of the law in the absence of a clearly negatived intention to
have the funds authorized for a particular purpose expended for such purpose." Uhl v.
Badaracco, 199 Cal. 270, 284, 248 P. 917, 922 (1926).
2. 22 Cal. App. 3d 643, 99 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1972).
3. Throughout this note, the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District
will be referred to as BART.
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and substitute surface trackage in its place. As a result, funds were
made available to build a transit station which had not been included
in the original plans. In short, improved transportation to a residen-
tial area was sacrificed to make possible a new facility serving a com-
mercial area.
This decision raises serious questions as to the extent of BART's
authority under the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District
Act4 and the role of pre-election publicity in public bond elections in
general. This note will examine the statutory procedures required un-
der the BART Act for the issuance of bonds5 and will analyze the
cases upon which the Tooker court based its decision. It is concluded
that the Tooker decision is indeed supported by a straightforward ap-
plication of existing law.6 Nevertheless, it is suggested that a contrary
result might have been reached by distinguishing several earlier cases.7
As a matter of simple fairness, a contrary result would seem to be de-
sirable. In light of the court's decision in this case, it is further sug-
gested that the legislature could take steps in the drafting of future
legislation to help eliminate disputes like that in Tooker.
Factual Background of the Tooker Dispute
To better understand the Tooker case, it is necessary to examine
some of the legislation by which BART was created.8  Although legis-
lation directed toward the establishment of a San Francisco bay area
rapid transit system dates back to 1949,0 for present purposes, only the
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District Act of 1957 will be
considered. 10 Specifically, those sections of the Act which relate to
4. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 28500-9757 (West 1965), as amended, (Supp.
1972).
5. Id. §§ 29150-59.
6. E.g., East Bay Municipal Util. Dist. v. Sindelar, 16 Cal. App. 3d 910,
94 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1971); Mills v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist.,
261 Cal. App. 2d 666, 68 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1968).
7. E.g., El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. Browne, 216 Cal. 269, 13 P.2d 921
(1932); Clough v. Duffy, 152 Cal. 311, 92 P. 859 (1907); Cullen v. Glendora Water
Co., 113 Cal. 503, 39 P. 769, aff'd on rehearing, 45 P. 822, modified, 45 P. 1047
(1896); Board of Directors v. Tregea, 88 Cal. 334, 26 P. 237 (1891), appeal dis-
missed, 164 U.S. 179 (1896); City of Los Angeles v. Dannenbrink, 234 Cal. App. 2d
642, 44 Cal. Rptr. 624 (1965); Behneman v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist.,
182 Cal. App. 2d 687, 6 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1960); Jennings v. Clearwater School Dist.,
65 Cal. App. 102, 223 P. 84 (1923).
8. See generally Griffith & Holmes, BART and the Victoria Line: A Comparison
of New Commuter Transport in California and London, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 780 (1967).
9. Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 1239, §§ 1-38, at 2173 (repealed in part 1957).
10. CAL. Ptm. UTIL. CODE §§ 28500-9757 (West 1965), as amended, (Supp.
1972).
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procedures for the issuance of bonds'" formed the focal point of the
Tooker dispute.
The BART Act required that a unique and rather elaborate pro-
cedure be followed prior to the submission of the original bond propo-
sition to the voters. The district was first required to employ a battery
of experts, including engineers, economists and fiscal experts, to de-
velop a set of general plans and specifications for the overall project,
sufficient to enable the district board to determine that the project
would be feasible.' 2 These experts were to submit to the district re-
ports which would include a general description of the facilities to be
acquired or constructed, the estimated cost and period of construction,
estimated operating revenues, the dollar amount of bonds required and
an estimate of the tax levy.' 3 Upon receipt of these reports, the dis-
trict board of directors14 was to determine whether the proposed plan
of work was feasible, whether the project as set forth was necessary
and, if so, to declare the board's findings by resolution and make an
order determining the amount of bonds that should be issued. 15 Next
the reports were to be referred to the boards of supervisors of the coun-
ties comprising the district. 16  These boards of supervisors were re-
quired to hold public hearings' 7 and then to determine by resolution
whether they approved the reports.' Only after the successful comple-
tion of these prescribed steps, and upon the unanimous approval from
the boards of supervisors, could the district call the special bond elec-
tion.' 9 The resolution calling for the election was to contain, inter
alia, "[a] statement of the general object and purpose of incurring the
indebtedness."
20
In order to avoid any taint of irregularity, BART diligently com-
plied with the statutory requirements. The experts2 ' were employed to
make the requisite study and produced a document which came to be
11. Id. §§ 29150-59.
12. Id. § 29151.
13. Id. § 29152.
14. See id. §§ 28730-42 for the creation, membership and organization of the
BART Board of Directors.
15. Id. § 29153.
16. Id. § 29154.
17. Id. § 29155.
18. Id. § 29156.
19. Id. § 29158.
20. Id. § 21959(a).
21. Employed as general engineering consultants were Parsons, Brinckerhoff,
Quade & Douglas; the Tudor Engineering Co.; and Bechtel Corp. These firms com-
prised the joint enterprise known as Parsons, Brinckerhoff-Tudor-Bechtel. Smith, Bar-
ney & Co. served as the financial consultant, Stone & Youngberg as the financial ad-
viser, and Van Beuren Stanbery as the economic consultant.
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known as the Composite Report." Following the dictates of Public
Utilities Code section 29153, BART determined that the proposed
plan of work as set forth in the Composite Report was feasible and the
project necessary. BART further determined the amount of bonds
necessary for the project to be $792 million, and referred the report to
the boards of supervisors of the three counties comprising the district.
23
Public hearings were duly held, and the report was approved by the
boards of supervisors. 24  Upon receiving these approvals, BART
promptly scheduled the bond election for Nov. 6, 1962.25  The Act re-
quired that 60% of the vote be cast in favor of issuing the bonds.
6
The actual affirmative vote was 61.2%, a narrow margin.2 7  Through-
out all of the pre-election planning, a massive public relations program
was conducted,28 culminating in the publicity given to the Composite
Report29 and the public hearings.3 0
22. BART, COMPOSITE REPORT, BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT, (May 1962) [herein-
after cited as COMPOSITE REPORT].
23. BART, Resolution 219, May 24, 1962. The counties which comprised the
district on this date were, and still are, Alameda, Contra Costa and San Francisco.
24. E.g., San Francisco, Cal., Board of Supervisors Resolution 394-62, July 9,
1962.
25. BART, Resolution 231, Aug. 9, 1962, as amended, Resolution 233, Aug. 23,
1962.
26. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 29168 (West 1965).
27. Griffith & Holmes, supra note 8, at 794.
28. Id. at 791-92.
In a statement to the BART Board of Directors, board president Adrien J. Falk
said: "So, while taking pride in what we have accomplished, we cannot rest. We
must see to it that these plans are fully and fairly explained. For it is only through
complete understanding by the public of what is proposed that rapid transit can be-
come a reality in this decade." BART, Minutes of Board of Directors 84th Meeting,
Oct. 26, 1961.
On July 26, 1962, Mr. Kendric B. Morrish addressed the BART Board of Di-
rectors from the audience, announcing the formation of a "Citizens for Rapid Transit
Committee" whose purpose was to inform the citizens of the district about the rapid
transit system. Id. 106th Meeting, July 26, 1962.
Following the success of the bond election, president Falk told the board: "I wish
to express my appreciation to members of the Board of Directors, the staff, the Citizens
Committee and countless volunteer workers-people who gave of their time and money
-also to the newspapers, TV and radio stations all of whom have given us liberal and
magnificent support. If only one or two of these elements had failed, we would not be
where we are today. The margin is not too great. It might have been overturned
without the support of those people." Id. 113th Meeting, Nov. 8, 1962.
29. See, e.g., San Francisco Chronicle, May 25, 1962, at 1, col. 2; San Francisco
Examiner, May 25, 1962, at 1, col. 1. These stories describe the referral of the
COMPOSITE REPORT to the boards of supervisors. The BART story had to compete for
first page coverage with the story of the safe return of astronaut Scott Carpenter from
the United States' second orbital space flight.
30. See, e.g., San Francisco Chronicle, July 10, 1962, at 1, col. 7; San Fran-
cisco Examiner, July 9, 1962, at 4, col. 1; id., July 10, 1962, at 1, col. 2.
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The dispute in the Tooker case centered upon the proper role of
the Composite Report in defining BART's obligations and in limiting
BART's authority. That portion of the report pertinent to the case is
as follows:
West of Twin Peaks a rapid transit subway for initial use by
streetcars is planned extending from the existing Twin Peaks Tun-
nel to a point just west of St. Francis Circle where surface opera-
tions resume. The West Portal Station is in subway in West Portal
Avenue at Vicente Street. Ramp connections to surface streetcar
operations are included in Ulloa Street and Junipero Serra Boule-
vard. This section west of Twin Peaks is identified as the Twin
Peaks Line.
. . . The Twin Peaks Line is 0.8 miles long and includes one
station.3 '
Thus, the Composite Report clearly shows a subway extending eight-
tenths of a mile west of Twin Peaks. However, some eight and a half
years after the bond election, a series of events occurred which elimi-
nated this subway line and thereby made funds available for the con-
struction of the so-called Embarcadero Station. On March 1, 1971,
the San Francisco Board of Supervisors approved a plan to build the
Embarcadero Station with BART funds.3" Shortly thereafter, BART
passed a resolution proposing that the Twin Peaks subway be replaced
with surface tracks and that the funds be applied to the Embarcadero
Station.33 On April 12, 1971, the City and County of San Francisco
and BART entered into an agreement giving effect to this change.34
In the ensuing litigation, the court noted, "the Composite Report
[had] not expressly plan[ned] for an 'Embarcadero Transit Station' in
San Francisco.""5
Reaction to the agreement took the form of a taxpayers class ac-
tion which was filed against BART seeking "(1) an order enjoining
the alteration of the Composite Report's plans as proposed in the agree-
ment of April 12, 1971, until authority therefor was given by the dis-
trict's voters, and (2) a mandatory order directing BART to 'com-
mence immediately or continue with deliberate speed the Twin Peaks
line and West Portal subway' as planned in the Composite Report."3 6
The superior court entered an order denying plaintiffs' motion for a
31. COMPOSITE REPORT at 19.
32. San Francisco, Cal., Board of Supervisors Resolution 109-71, March 1, 1971.
33. BART, Resolution 1727, March 11, 1971.
34. San Francisco, Cal., Board of Supervisors Resolution 196-71, April 12, 1971
(authorizing the mayor to execute the agreement).
35. Tooker v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 22 Cal. App. 3d 643,
647, 99 Cal. Rptr. 361, 363 (1972).
36. Id. at 652, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
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preliminary injunction and this order was affirmed on appeal.3 7  The
basic issue before the court on this appeal was: Should the Composite
Report, its approval by the boards of supervisors, and its attendant
publicity become part of a contract-like relation between BART and
the voters, or should it otherwise limit BART's authority. The court
answered both questions in the negative.
Basis for the Tooker Decision
The task of the courts, when confronted with proposed changes in
bond issues that have been approved by the voters, is to harmonize
the ever-present need for legislative flexibility with the constitu-
tional and statutory policy that the electorate shall directly con-
trol public indebtedness .... 38
Although it is true that from an early date the courts have strictly ad-
hered to a general policy of upholding the concept of public control
over public spending,39 it is also true that the terms of that control have
been strictly limited.40
In trying to strike this delicate balance, the courts have espoused
several theories to characterize the relationship between the voters and
the bond issuing entity. None of these theories has been well defined
nor has any one theory been consistently adhered to. In Merchants
National Bank v. Escondido Irrigation District" the California Su-
preme Court said:
The act providing for the organization of the district, and the or-
ganization of the district under the provisions of the act by the
vote of its electors, cannot be otherwise regarded than as a con-
tract between the state and the individuals whose property was
thereby affected. 42
Some eighteen years later, the same court had occasion to comment on
this language in what has become the leading case of Peery v. City of
Los Angeles.
4 3
We do not, however, deem it necessary to go so far in this case
as to hold that a contractual relation, in the ordinary sense of the
37. Id.
38. Comment, Alteration of Rights in California Public Securities, 53 CALIF. L.
REv. 1081, 1082 (1965).
39. See, e.g., Peery v. City of Los Angeles, 187 Cal. 753, 203 P. 992 (1922);
Skinner v. City of Santa Rosa, 107 Cal. 464, 40 P. 742 (1895).
40. See, e.g., City of Santa Clara v. Von Raesfeld, 3 Cal. 3d 239, 474 P.2d 976,
90 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1970); El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. Browne, 216 Cal. 269, 13 P.2d
921 (1932); Clough v. Duffy, 152 Cal. 311, 92 P. 859 (1907); Cullen v. Glendora
Water Co., 113 Cal. 503, 39 P. 769, aff'd on rehearing, 45 P. 822, modified, 45 P.
1047 (1896); Board of Directors v. Tregea, 88 Cal. 334, 26 P. 237 (1891), appeal
dismissed, 164 U.S. 179 (1896).
41. 144 Cal. 329, 77 P. 937 (1904).
42. Id. at 335, 77 P. at 939.
43. 187 Cal. 753, 203 P. 992 (1922).
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term, has been created . . . but we are satisfied that a status
analogous to such relation was created through the exercise of
the constitutional right of the electors . . . in approving the
creation of the bonded indebtedness . . . upon the express con-
ditions and assurances contained in the act.. . which may not be
changed . . . without working, in effect, a fraud upon the elec-
tors. .... 44
Thus, the Peery court withdrew somewhat from finding an actual con-
tract between the electors and the issuing entity. Chief Justice Shaw,
in a concurring opinion, preferred to characterize the relationship as
a grant of authority vested in the issuing entity by the approval of the
voters. The governing body is, in effect, an agent of the voters.45
Despite the clear refusal of the Peery court to find a contractual
relationship, there have been later cases, including Tooker, which have
continued to talk in terms of contract. 46 But whether the theory ap-
plied is couched in terms of a "contract" or of a "grant of authority,"
the fundamental principle of public control of spending has held firm.
This principle was expressed clearly in Skinner v. City of Santa Rosa:
4 7
If the terms and conditions submitted to the electors may be
desparted [sic] from, and such election held to authorize the is-
suance of bonds under other terms and conditions, a door will be
opened . . . to submit a proposition so favorable as to secure be-
yond question a favorable vote, and then change the conditions
. . . even without any fraudulent purpose or intent, so that, if
again submitted, an overwhelming defeat would result.
48
The key to the Tooker case, as well as to all cases where a viola-
tion of bond purposes is alleged, is a determination of precisely what
was, in fact, submitted to the voters. The answer to this question
44. Id. at 767, 203 P. at 998.
45. Id. at 769-70, 203 P. at 999.
46. E.g., O'Farrell v. County of Sonoma, 189 Cal. 343, 348, 208 P. 117, 119
(1922); East Bay Municipal Util. Dist. v. Sindelar, 16 Cal. App. 3d 910, 918, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 431, 435 (1971); Mills v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 261 Cal.
App. 2d 666, 668, 68 Cal. Rptr. 317, 319 (1968). But see State School Bldg. Fin.
Comm. v. Betts, 216 Cal. App. 2d 685, 31 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1963). The Betts court
said of the Peery rule: "It is not necessary to draw contractual analogies. The logical
basis for invalidating such amendments is not that they violate a metaphorical con-
tract; rather, that they clash with the constitutional provision which required popular
approval of the bonds in the first place . . . ." Id. at 693, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 263. This
interpretation was quoted with approval in City of Santa Clara v. Von Raesfeld, 3 Cal.
3d 239, 249, 474 P.2d 976, 982, 90 Cal. Rptr. 8, 14 (1970). The Von Raesfeld
court went on to say: "Since voter approval of the present bonds was not compelled
by the Constitution [CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 18 (now art. XIII, § 40)], we conclude
that no vested rights arose in the electorate by virtue of the initial authorization to
issue bonds." Id. In neither case, however, was violation of a voter-approved bond
purpose alleged. The Tooker, Sindelar and Mills cases, decided since Betts, continued
to use the contract theory when discussing violation of bond purposes.
47. 107 Cal. 464, 40 P. 742 (1895).
48. Id. at 472, 40 P. at 745.
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balances the scale and often serves to give the governing body the flexi-
bility and discretionary power necessary to carry out the bond purposes
efficiently. Quite clearly, the actual ballot proposition itself is sub-
mitted to the voters, and thus it constitutes one element of the contract-
like relationship between the voters and the bond issuing entity. The
ballot defines the obligations of the district even if it includes terms and
conditions which were not required to be submitted to a vote.4 9 Further-
more, any applicable statutes under which the bonds are to be issued are
presumed to be known to every elector, and thus such statutes become
elements of the relationship.5" Similarly, the statute which created the
bond issuing entity itself is presumed to be known to every elector, so
the terms of enabling legislation are additional elements. 1 Finally,
the order by the bond issuing entity which calls for the election has
been held to define the grant of authority even if the details of that or-
der are not included on the actual ballot.
52
In deciding not to include the terms of the Composite Report as
an additional element in the contract-like relation, the Tooker court
clearly drew the line so as not to add further restrictions on public
bond issuers. Although the BART resolution which called the bond
election did make reference to the proposed transit system extending
west of Twin Peaks, 53 the court noted that the resolution made no
mention whatever of whether any particular portion of the system
would be elevated, in subway, or on the surface. 54  The wording on
49. Id.
50. Peery v. City of Los Angeles, 187 Cal. 753, 761, 203 P. 992, 995 (1922).
51. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Wright, 213 Cal. 335, 349,
2 P.2d 168, 173-74 (1931).
52. Jenkins v. Williams, 14 Cal. App. 89, 97, 111 P. 116, 119 (1910).
53. The resolution, as quoted by the court, reads in pertinent part: "A statement
of the general object and purpose of incurring said indebtedness as set forth in said
measure is as follows: By incurring said indebtedness the District will be in a position
to acquire, construct and complete a mass rapid transit system connecting the City and
County of San Francisco, Alameda County and Contra Costa County. The San
Francisco downtown element of the rapid transit system will connect with the San
Francisco approach to the Trans-Bay Tube in the vicinity of the Embarcadero and will
extend west of Twin Peaks." Tooker v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist.,
22 Cal. App. 3d 643, 647, 99 Cal. Rptr. 361, 363 (1972).
As pointed out by the appellant in Tooker, Resolution 231 also refers to the
Composite Report: "Whereas . . . the proposed plan of work is feasible and . . . the
project as outlined in said report is necessary [the election shall be held]." Appel-
lant's Opening Brief at 21-22, Tooker v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist.,
22 Cal. App. 3d 643, 99 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1972). But the court, quoting from Mills v.
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 261 Cal. App. 2d 666, 669, 68 Cal.
Rptr., 317, 320 (1968), said that this reference in the resolution to the Composite
Report was "only by way of recital." 22 Cal. App. 3d at 651, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 365
(1972).
54. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 649-50, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 364 (1972).
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the ballot measure was even more general than the resolution, contain-
ing no reference to routes whatsoever.56 The enabling act, although
calling for the preparation of the Composite Report, did not specify
routes, much less whether they were to be above or below ground.5 6
The plaintiffs-appellants in Tooker made the argument that since
the bond measure was based on the Composite Report, the relation-
ship between the voters and the District could only be defined by ref-
erence to that report. 57  They further argued that the elaborate pro-
cedure required under the BART enabling act, and especially the ap-
proval of the Composite Report by the county boards of supervisors,
evidenced an intention to make such approval a condition precedent to
the holding of the bond election. Appellants concluded that this left
the District "without authority to deviate substantially from the plan
or to repudiate it . . . ."s The court responded to these arguments
by emphasizing that the Composite Report was merely a feasibility
study.
There was obviously no legislative intent, and it would otherwise
be unreasonable to conclude, that the feasibility report became
binding in the details of its study on BART, and later as a con-
tract between BART and the taxpayers of the district.
The acceptance and approval of the Composite Report by
BART amounted in law to no more than acceptance of its recom-
mendation that the proposed rapid transit project was feasible. In
thereafter planning and constructing the project, and in spending
55. The court quoted the exact language of the ballot measure as follows:
"Shall San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District incur a bonded indebtedness
in the principal amount of $792,000,000 for the object and purpose of acquiring,
constructing and operating a rapid transit system for the transportation of passengers
and their incidental baggage, including rights of way, rail lines, bus lines, stations,
platforms, switches, yards, terminals, parking lots and any and all other facilities nec-
essary or convenient for rapid transit service within or partly without the district,
underground, upon or above the ground and under, upon, or over public streets, high-
ways, bridges, tubes, tunnels, or other public ways or waterways, together with all
physical structures necessary or convenient for the access of persons and vehicles
thereto, including lands, easements, rights to the use or joint use of any or all of the
foregoing and all other works, property or structures necessary or convenient to carry
out the objects, purposes and powers vested in the District under the 'San Francisco
Bay Area Rapid Transit District Act'?"
On voting machines, the ballot read:
"San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District Bonds: Authorizing San Fran-
cisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District to incur a bonded indebtedness of $792,000,000
for a rapid transit system pursuant to the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit
District Act." Id. at 648, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64.
56. See CAL. PUB. UnL. CODE §§ 29150-59 (West 1965), as amended, (Supp.
1972).
57. Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Tooker v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid
Transit Dist., 22 Cal. App. 3d 643, 99 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1972).
58. Id. at 15-16.
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the bond proceeds, BART was in no way restricted by state-
ments of the Composite Report. 59
In reaching its decision, the court relied primarily on two recent
California court of appeal opinions. 60  The case of Mills v. San Fran-
cisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District6 received primary emphasis
since that case was directly in point. The Mills dispute had a similar
factual background in which the effect of the same Composite Report
had to be determined. In Mills, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
BART district from locating the Lafayette station one and one-half
miles from the location specified in the Composite Report. BART's
motion for a summary judgment was granted, and this was affirmed
on appeal. 62 The Tooker court clearly felt that the Mills case was con-
trolling since it was quoted extensively.63 The Mills decision did, in
fact, use strong language in rejecting the idea that the Composite Re-
port imposed any serious restrictions on BART. Heavy emphasis was
again placed on the general nature of the wording of the resolution
calling the bond election and of the ballot proposition itself. Refer-
ring to the resolution,64 the Mills court said:
This statement's only reference to the station here in issue was
that the system would provide connection "east via a Central
Contra Costa line to the vicinity of Concord," a community near
Lafayette.
It is completely apparent that neither the ballot proposition
nor the notice of election specified the location of any station, nor
even required a station in or adjoining Lafayette.6 5
Thus, the Lafayette station could have been eliminated entirely with-
out recourse to the voters. Similarly, the Composite Report was dis-
missed as being of no effect, the court finding that it was merely a fea-
sibility study which imposed no additional restrictions on BART.
Obviously, the statutes, the notice of election and the ballot
proposition itself contemplate a broad authority for construction of
a three-county rapid transit system. In the wide scope of this
substantial transit project, the deviation of 1 1/2 miles in location of
a single station is but a minor change in the tentative plan which
was relied upon only to forecast feasibility of the project as a
whole.66
59. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 650, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65 (1972).
60. East Bay Municipal Util. Dist. v. Sindelar, 16 Cal. App. 3d 910, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 431 (1971); Mills v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 261 Cal. App.
2d 666, 68 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1968).
61. 261 Cal. App. 2d 666, 68 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1968).
62. Id.
63. 22 Cal. App. 3d 643, 650-51, 99 Cal. Rptr. 361, 365 (1972).
64. BART, Resolution 231, Aug. 9, 1962, as amended, Resolution 233, Aug. 23,
1962.
65. 261 Cal. App. 2d 666, 669, 68 Cal. Rptr. 317, 319-20 (1968).
66. Id. at 669, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
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The other recent case, upon which the Tooker court relied, was
East Bay Municipal Utility District v. Sindelar.67 In Sindelar the util-
ity district had received authorization from the voters to issue $252
million in bonds for the purpose of financing a water facilities con-
struction program. The program had been described in a feasibility
report and in other pre-election public statements as a ten-year pro-
gram. The planned program had been substantially completed within
ten years, with $84 million in bonds still unissued. The district, faced
with a need for further expansion, ordered the sale of $12 million in
bonds. However, this order came twelve years after the bond election,
and the district treasurer refused to execute the bonds claiming that to
do so would be in violation of the bond purposes. This claim was
based on the fact that only a ten-year program for the construction of
specified facilities had been authorized by the voters. The district pe-
titioned for a writ of mandate ordering its treasurer to execute the
bonds and the court of appeal granted the writ. Once again, the court
looked only to the ordinance calling the bond election and to the ballot
proposition to define the limits of the district's authority. "In spend-
ing the bond proceeds the district is not restricted . . . by statements
made in engineering or feasibility reports . . . upon which the . . .
bond proposal was based.
'68
In each of the decisions discussed above, the court found pre-
election publicity to have no legal effect.6 9 In Mills the court simply
stated that such publicity "cannot be deemed to modify the intentionally
broad language of the proposition in fact submitted to the voters, the
call of election published to them, and the statutes authorizing the pro-
cedure adopted. ' 70 The Tooker court quoted this passage with ap-
proval, although it did characterize the publicity as unfortunate.7 1
Although some jurisdictions require that the purpose for the re-
quested bond authorization be stated specifically on the ballot,72 Cal-
67. 16 Cal. App. 3d 910, 94 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1971).
68. Id. at 918, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
69. Tooker v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 22 Cal. App. 3d 643,
651-52, 99 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366 (1972); East Bay Municipal Util. Dist. v. Sindelar,
16 Cal. App. 3d 910, 918, 94 Cal. Rptr. 431, 436 (1971); Mills v. San Francisco Bay
Area Rapid Transit Dist., 261 Cal. App. 2d 666, 669, 68 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320 (1968).
Accord, City of Los Angeles v. Dannenbrink, 234 Cal. App. 2d 642, 655, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 624, 632 (1965); Behneman v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 182 Cal.
App. 2d 687, 696, 6 Cal. Rptr. 382, 388 (1960); Jennings v. Clearwater School Dist.,
65 Cal. App. 102, 105, 223 P. 84, 86 (1923).
70. 261 Cal. App. 2d 666, 669, 68 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320 (1968).
71. 22 Cal. App. 3d 643, 651-52, 99 Cal. Rptr. 361,366 (1972).
72. See, e.g., Henson v. School Dist., 150 Kan. 610, 95 P.2d 346 (1939);
Schnoerr v. Miller, 2 Ohio St. 2d 121, 206 N.E.2d 902 (1965); Johnson v. City of
Muskogee, 194 Okl. 513, 153 P.2d 118 (1944); Borin v. City of Erick, 190 Old. 519,
125 P.2d 768 (1942).
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ifornia allows considerable leeway on this point. The proposition
must be stated on the ballot with sufficient certainty so as not to mis-
lead the voters, but details are not required.73 Numerous cases have
held that the bond proposition may be submitted to the voters in gen-
eral terms.74
Summary
Where does all of this leave the average voter? It appears that
he can be asked to vote on a bond proposition stated in general terms,
that he can not rely on pre-election publicity to define the bond pur-
poses more specifically, nor can he rely on engineering and feasibility
reports for this definition, even where reports are required by statute
prior to the submission of the bond proposal to the voters. It is true,
of course, that the ballot proposition can not be stated so as to mislead
the voter. 7" However, it is reasonable to suggest that the voters can
and are being asked, in effect, to buy an unknown product, not be-
cause they are consciously being misled, but because there is a simple
lack of definition. The remainder of this note will examine ways in
which the Tooker court could have reached a different conclusion, one
which would have lessened the uncertainty of the voter's position. Al-
ternatively, this note will make suggestions as to how the legislature
could act to reduce uncertainties in drafting future bond legislation.
The Tooker Decision Criticized
Before examining alternative lines of reasoning which might have
been employed to decide Tooker, it ought to be decided if the result
the court reached was fundamentally unfair. Despite what the law
may say, did the voters actually have reason to believe, at the time of
the election, that a "yes" vote would result in the construction of a sub-
way west of Twin Peaks? It is important to contend with the question
of legislative intent. 76  Yet is is equally important to contend with the
intent of the voters themselves.77 There is little question that the
73. Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 160 Cal. 317, 320, 116 P. 966, 967 (1911).
74. E.g., Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Marquardt, 59 Cal. 2d 159, 181, 379 P.2d
28, 39, 28 Cal. Rptr. 724, 735 (1963); Sacramento Municipal Util. Dist. v. All Par-
ties, 6 Cal. 2d 197, 202, 57 P.2d 506, 508 (1936); O'Farrell v. County of Sonoma,
189 Cal. 343, 347, 208 P. 117, 119 (1922); Mills v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid
Transit Dist., 261 Cal. App. 2d 666, 668, 68 Cal. Rptr. 317, 319 (1968).
75. E.g., Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 160 Cal. 317, 116 P. 966 (1911);
Anselmi v. City of Rock Springs, 53 Wyo. 223, 80 P.2d 419 (1938) (leading case)
76. See Tooker v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 22 Cal. App. 3d
643, 650, 99 Cal. Rptr. 361, 364-65 (1972).
77. But see County of San Diego v. Perrigo, 155 Cal. App. 2d 644, 648-49,
318 P.2d 542, 546 (1957) (courts will not speculate whether outcome of election
would have been different if subsequently developed facts had been known to voters).
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BART voters had ample reason to believe that they in fact had au-
thorized a subway west of Twin Peaks and further, that their vote re-
quired the construction of such a subway. The Tooker court alluded
to such a belief in saying: "It appears to be true, unfortunately, that
prior to the BART bond election there was much unofficial discussion
and publicity concerning the 'proposed' West Portal subway. '78  It
would seem that pre-election publicity, whether it be "official" or "un-
official," could properly be characterized as unfortunate only if it ma-
terially misled the voters. Public information, which states the facts as
they really are, aids the voter in reaching a correct decision, and, thus,
is helpful, not "unfortunate.1
7 9
The court's use of the word "unofficial '80 is also puzzling. While
it is true that newspaper reports"- could properly be so classified, in
what sense can the Composite Report, which was required by statute,
published by BART, discussed in public hearings, and approved by
the boards of supervisors, 2 be deemed "unofficial"?
Of course, the court dismissed the Composite Report as merely a
feasibility study, which in no way restricted BART in expending the
bond proceeds.8 3  The question remains whether the voters under-
stood the Composite Report to be only a feasibility study, and, if they
did, in what sense they understood the word "feasible" in relation to
the proceedings. The court defined "feasible" as: "Capable of being
done, executed, or effected; possible of realization ... ."84 Perhaps
it should be added that the word is also defined as "suitable . ..
[1]ikely; probable; reasonable. '85  It is true that the experts were re-
quired to prepare a report "sufficient in the opinion of the [district]
board to enable the board to determine the feasibility of such pro-
jects."88  However, the statute did not specify that approval by the
boards of supervisors would constitute another finding of feasibility.
The only requirement was that the boards of supervisors, after a pub-
lic hearing, should "determine whether it approves the reports .... ,,87
With respect to approval by the district board, it is reasonable to
suggest that the presence of the word "feasible" in the statute relates
78. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 651, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
79. See remarks of Adrien J. Falk on October 26, 1971, supra note 28.
80. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 651, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
81. Newspaper articles cited supra, notes 29 & 30.
82. See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
83. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 650, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
84. Id., 99 Cal. Rptr. at 364, quoting from WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATiONAL
DIcTToNARY (2d ed. 1959).
85. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATiONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1959).
86. CAL. PUB. UT.. CODE § 29151 (West 1965).
87. Id. § 29156.
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more to a determination of the practicality of certain engineering and
financial findings, rather than to basic policy decisions, such as which
geographic areas should receive which type of service. The authors
of the Composite Report seemed to understand that their report to the
district board would be used to determine feasibility in the engineering
and financial sense.
The Composite Report ... describes [the] general system
and determines the engineering feasibility of this general system.
Construction plans and specifications remain, of course, to be pre-
pared before construction bids are obtained and construction be-
gins; and circumstances then existing may well result in some
variations within this general framework.88
Although BART contended that this very language in the report made
it clear that changes in the plan could be made after approval of the
bonds,89 the context of this caveat provides the better view that the
variations referred to are those made necessary by engineering and
construction problems.
If that is so, there is a clear inference that policy questions were
to be resolved by the approvals of the respective boards of supervisors.
This inference is borne out by examining the record of the public hear-
ing which preceded the approval by the San Francisco Board of Su-
pervisors.9 ° At that hearing, questions such as the amount of money it
would cost to move a given number of tons of earth were not consid-
ered.' 1 Instead, it was found that:
Mr. John Everson, Project Engineer, representing the engi-
neering consultants, appeared to outline and explain by means of
maps and exhibits the routing and the physical set-up of the plan
insofar as it affects San Francisco. 92
Clearly then, the subjects of discussion were the location of routes, the
areas of the city to be served by the transit system, and the general
physical description of the system. 93  The change in plan allowed by
88. COMPOSITE REPORT at 86 (emphasis added).
89. Brief for Respondent at 14, Tooker v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit
Dist., 22 Cal. App. 3d 643, 99 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1972).
90. 57 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS, SAN FRANcISco BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 346-50
(1962).
91. See id.
92. Id. at 347.
93. The only objections to the plan, and the only reservations expressed with re-
gard to the plan, related to the system's cost and to the lack of service to residential
areas of the city.
"Mr. Bobby Jones stated that he is not opposed to the plan, but suggests certain
extensions thereof, namely, the addition of service to Geary Street, Judah Street, Nob
Hill and Pacific Heights." Id. at 348.
"Mrs. Thomas R. Best, Great Highway Club, stated that she believed residents
of the Sunset and Richmond Districts will not vote for the bond issue because improved
service on the N and B Lines [of the Municipal Railroad System] is not included in the
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the Tooker decision was simply the result of a change in policy; a pol-
icy seemingly fixed when the supervisorial approval was given to the
Composite Report.
The Tooker court failed to meet the question of the effect of su-
pervisorial approval with any real argument. The court simply stated
that this approval "had the legal effect of a determination by those
bodies that the rapid transit project was feasible." 94  But if the defini-
tion of "feasible" used by the court is applied, i.e., "capable of being
done," it is clear that the public hearing discussed above did not reach
this question. The court continued:
It would be unreasonable to hold that the supervisorial approval
bound BART to the preliminary and tentative details of the Com-
posite Report. It would also be contrary to law; section 29158
provides that upon such approval BART shall submit to the voters
"the proposition of incurring such bonded indebtedness for the ac-
quisition, construction or completion of rapid transit facilities by
the district and all other works, property, or structures necessary
or convenient therefor and for the purpose of carrying out the pro-
visions of this part." By this language BART is given
broad powers in designing and constructing the system; this is
irreconcilable with any theory that the feasibility report of sec-
tions 29151 and 29152 controls those matters. 95
It is not apparent, at least to this author, how the statute providing for
submission of the bond proposition to the voters relates to the legal ef-
fect of the supervisorial approval. While it is true that the approval
was a prerequisite for submitting the plan to the voters, if this is the
only legal effect of the approval, it is devoid of any substance. As
pointed out earlier, the statute relating to this approval does not men-
tion the word "feasible." '96 Furthermore, the court twice said that it
would be "unreasonable" to give the Composite Report binding ef-
fact.97  It may be argued that such effect is contrary to existing law,
but it certainly can not be said that granting such binding effect is un-
plan." Id.
"Supervisor Halley ... observed that in his opinion this is not a perfect rapid
transit plan for San Francisco; that it does not tie in Duboce Avenue to the Sunset
and Parkside Districts, and there is a lack of service north of Market Street and to the
Richmond District, due to financial considerations." Id. at 349.
"Supervisor Ferdon . . . stated that he regrets . . . that there is only limited
service to the Sunset and Richmond, but he feels that eventually this win be ex-
panded." Id.
"While [Supervisor Tinney] feels that the lack of service to the Sunset and
Richmond is regrettable, he believes that this will be added at a later date, as well as
service to all outlying districts." Id. at 350.
94. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 651, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
95. Id., 99 Cal. Rptr. at 365-66.
96. CAL. Pus. UT. CODE § 29156 (West 1965).
97. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 650, 651, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
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reasonable. After all, this was the report which was widely publi-
cized. Similarly, this was the report upon which public hearings were
based. It is, therefore, entirely reasonable to conclude that this was
the report upon which the voters relied.
A preferred construction of the statutes in question would be to
have the district board determine the feasibility of the plan proposed
in the Composite Report. The report would then be referred to the
boards of supervisors for the policy determination of whether the pro-
posed plan provides satisfactory service to their respective communi-
ties at a price which they can afford. The voters would then be faced
with the question: Are you willing to incur a bonded indebtedness of
$792 million in order to obtain the transit service specified in the Com-
posite Report? This would seem to be a reasonable construction of the
required procedures, and one which the average voter would likely as-
sume.
Earlier Cases Distinquished
Despite the fact that the Tooker decision seems to offend one's
sense of justice, it is clear that to reach a contrary result the court
would have found it necessary to distinguish a number of previous
cases." The court could have cited other cases in support of its de-
cision.9 9 On the other hand, it is the contention of this author that
Tooker could have marked a new point of departure without doing un-
due violence to existing law.
The first, and most obvious, distinction from prior cases is that
the BART Act is unique. Its bonding procedure is unlike that of any
other transit district in California.' To that extent, and except for
the Mills case, the court was free to interpret the statute. Not only is
the BART bonding procedure unlike that of any other transit district,
its procedural requirements are far more stringent than those of most
98. See cases cited notes 6-7 supra.
99. See cases cited note 7 supra.
100. Compare CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 29150-59 (West 1965) (San Francisco
Bay Area Rapid Transit District) with id. §§ 26201-12 (transit districts in Alameda
or Contra Costa Counties); id. §§ 30900-13 (Southern California Rapid Transit
District); id. §§ 40225-37 (West Supp. 1972) (Orange County Rapid Transit District);
id. §§ 50225-37 (West 1965) (Stockton Metropolitan Transit District); id. §§ 70225-
37 (MaNn County Transit District); id. §§ 90600-12 (West Supp. 1972) (San Diego
County Transit District); id. §§ 94600-12 (Santa Barbara Metropolitan Transit
District); id. §§ 98310-18 (Santa Cruz Metropolitan Transit District); id. §§ 100400-13
(Santa Clara County Transit District); id. §§ 101280-98 (Greater Bakersfield Met-
ropolitan Transit District); id. §§ 102500-13 (Sacramento Regional Transit District).
Only the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District specifically requires a feasi-
bility report, an approval of that report by two different boards, and the submission of
the report to a public hearing.
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bond issuing entities.10 1 Many districts having the power to issue
bonds are not specifically required by statute to make feasibility stud-
ies, or to prepare plans for the purpose of estimating costs, prior to the
submission of the bond proposition to the voters. 102 Some districts,
however, are required to prepare reports and estimates prior to the
vote.
10 3
However, before analyzing cases which were decided under other
statutes, the Mills case clearly must be dealt with. The Mills dispute
was identical to Tooker, except for the nature of the change which was
in controversy. Thus, in order to argue for a contrary result in the
Tooker case, one of two possible conclusions must be reached. Either
there exists a sufficient factual distinction between Mills and Tooker to
justify different results or, alternatively, the Mills decision is just as
wrong as Tooker. Arguments can be made to support both conclu-
sions. Since the arguments against Tooker inevitably apply as well to
Mills, the second conclusion seems preferable, i.e., both cases are
wrong. However, even if it is assumed that the court of appeal for the
first district was loath to overrule itself, there are significant factual dis-
tinctions between the two cases sufficient to allow a different result.
Compared to the elimination of a subway in favor of surface
tracks, it is probably true that "the deviation of 1% miles in location
of a single station is but a minor change... ,,,104 particularly in view
of the fact that Lafayette is, comparatively speaking, a sparsely settled
suburban community. The average commuter would likely depend on
automobile transportation to reach the transit station in any case.
Furthermore, the new location of the station is closer to the geographic
center of the community than was the location specified in the Com-
posite Report."5 Thus, it could be concluded that the change of plan
allowed by Mills was beneficial to the community as a whole.
101. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 21701-09, 21751-56 (West 1969) (school
districts); CAL. PUB. UT,. CODE,§§ 13201-12 (West 1965) (municipal utility districts);
CAL. WATER CODE §§ 24950-64 (West 1956) (irrigation districts). While many dis-
tricts have one or more of the elements embodied in the BART bond procedure, none
contain them all.
102. See, e.g., CAL. EDuc. CODE §§ 21701-09, 21751-56 (West 1969) (school
districts); CAL. PuB. UrL. CODE §§ 13201-12 (West 1965) (municipal utility dis-
tricts); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 31370-416 (West 1956) (county water districts); id.
§§ 60270-82 (West 1966) (water replenishment districts).
103. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE H§ 24950-64 (West 1956) (irrigation districts);
id. §§ 35950-54 (West 1956), as amended (Supp. 1972) (water districts); id.
H§ 56050-55 (West 1956) (county drainage districts); CAL. WATER CODE APP. §§ 28-4
to 28-6 (West 1968) (Los-Angeles County Flood Control District).
104. 261 Cal. App. 2d 666, 669, 68 Cal. Rptr. 317, 319 (1968).
105. The new location of the Lafayette station is at Happy Valley Rd. and Cal.
Highway 24, roughly four-tenths mile west of the community's business area centered
at Moraga Rd. and Mt. Diablo Blvd. The original location was to have been roughly
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On the other hand, the elimination of a subway is a change
which affects both aesthetics and service and is the type of change
which has been known to produce intense controversy in the past. In-
deed, after the BART bonds were authorized, the residents of Berke-
ley were so strongly in favor of replacing the planned elevated BART
line with subway, that special legislation was enacted to enable them
to form a special service district." 6 As a result, Berkeley voters decided
overwhelmingly to assume an additional bonded indebtedness to
place that portion of the transit system within their boundaries under-
ground.'1 7 In their argument for a rehearing, the appellants in Tooker
said that the court "erroneously and rather incredibly equates the re-
location of the Lafayette Station with the deletion of the West Portal
Subway."' 1 8 Once the court accepted the idea, however, that the Com-
posite Report placed no restrictions on BART,' ° such an equation is
not incredible; rather, it is to be expected. The best route to a con-
trary result would have been to give the report binding effect through
distinguishing previous cases, and in so doing, overrule Mills.
As discussed earlier,110 Tooker also relied heavily on East Bay
Municipal Utility District v. Sindelar."' Despite some of the language
in Sindelar which seems to support Tooker,"' the facts of the case can
easily be distinguished. In Sindelar, the utility district had apparently
exercised its best managerial talent. The facilities for which the bonds
had been issued had been substantially completed, with a third of the
originally authorized bonds still unissued. It was not a question of
eliminating a planned facility in favor of an unplanned facility.
Rather, it was simply a question of whether the district could issue pre-
viously authorized bonds to install new facilities after completing all
those projects called for in the original plan. Furthermore, it should
be noted that the engineering feasibility report at issue in Sindelar had
not been required by statute" 3 but had been developed to aid the dis-
trict in their planning. Nonetheless, the court did say that "[i]n
spending the bond proceeds the district is not restricted . . . by state-
ments made in engineering or feasibility reports . . . upon which the
. . . bond proposal was based.""' 4  Since that simple statement offers
1.1 miles east of this central area, near Pleasant Hill Road and Cal. Highway 24.
106. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 29660-740 (West Supp. 1972).
107. Griffith & Holmes, supra note 8, at 798 n.97.
108. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 1-2, Tooker v. San Francisco Bay
Area Rapid Transit Dist., 22 Cal. App. 3d 643, 99 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1972).
109. 22 Cal. App. 3d 643, 650, 99 Cal. Rptr. 361, 364-65 (1972).
110. See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
111. 16 Cal. App. 3d 910, 94 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1971).
112. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
113. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 13202 (West 1965).
114. 16 Cal. App. 3d at 918, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
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strong support for Tooker, it is important to look at the cases from
which it is derived.
Engineering and Feasibility Reports
Chief among these cases is El Dorado Irrigation District v.
Browne."x5 In that case, the district, pursuant to statutory require-
ments, had employed an engineer to prepare plans for an irrigation
project in order to make an estimate of the amount of bonds necessary.
The bonds were authorized by the voters and, subsequently, substan-
tial changes were made in the original plan. The court was directly
confronted with the question of whether the district had the power to
use funds in accordance with a plan which differed substantially from
that upon which the original estimate was based. The court answered
by saying: "We conclude that an irrigation district may, under the ex-
isting law, make substantial changes in the plan of a proposed project,
after the election at which bonds are voted."11 6 However, this lan-
guage should be read in context with the statute which governed irri-
gation districts at that time.11r The statute provided that no material
changes could be made in the plan without the consent of the bond
certification commission." 8  Of this provision, the court said: "The
futility of limiting the exercise of a nonexistent power indicates that the
power really did exist. . . ."I" Thus, the court had before it direct
evidence of legislative intent that the district was not to be bound by
the engineering report.12 0  This kind of evidence is not found in the
BART Act.
12'
However, merely distinguishing El Dorado on this ground is not
sufficient because an earlier irrigation district case had made a similar
ruling at a time when the statute did not require an engineering report,
and thus did not provide for its modification. In Board of Directors v.
Tregea122 bonds had been authorized by a vote of the electors in the
furtherance of a plan to irrigate 108 thousand acres by bringing water
from the Stanislaus River. Subsequent to the vote, a petition was filed,
in accordance with statutory procedures, 2 3 in which certain landown-
115. 216 Cal. 269, 13 P.2d 921 (1932).
116. Id. at 273, 13 P.2d at 923.
117. Cal. Stat. 1917, ch. 557, § 20, at 762, amending Cal. Stat. 1887, ch. 34,
§ 30, at 40.
118. Id. Now the consent must come from the State Treasurer. CAL. WATER
CODE § 24964 (West Supp. 1972).
119. 216 Cal. 269, 273, 13 P.2d 921,923.
120. However, if the plan is specified on the ballot, the commission is without
authority to approve a change of plans. 4 Op. CAL. A-r'Y GEN. 317 (1944).
121. See CAL. PuB. Urn. CoDE 28500-9757 (West 1965).
122. 88 Cal. 334, 26 P. 237 (1891), appeal dismissed, 164 U.S. 179 (1896).
123. Cal. Stat. 1889, ch. 21, §§ 1-14, at 21-25 (repealed 1955), amending Cal.
Stat. 1887, ch. 34, at 29 (repealed in part 1943).
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ers asked to be excluded from the district. The excluded land com-
prised 28 thousand acres. The district then modified its plan so as to
irrigate the remaining 80 thousand acres with water from the Tuolumne
River and ordered the sale of bonds for half the amount authorized.
A disgruntled landowner, who had wanted to be excluded from the
district but who had been unable to be excluded, objected to the bond
sale claiming the changed plan was not authorized by a vote. The court
rejected his claim saying: "There is nothing in the law to prevent the
directors from changing their plans in this respect whenever they find
it to the advantage of the district to do So. '124 There are two things
to note about this decision. First, the development of a plan was not
required by statute at that time.12 '5 Second, the change had been brought
about by following a statutory procedure 126 in which a direct petition
by landowners was used. This was by no means a unilateral act on the
part of the district.
The Sindelar decision rested on one other case relating to the critical
question of engineering and feasibility reports. In Clough v. Duffy1
27
the City and County of San Francisco received authorization to issue
street improvement bonds. Prior to the vote, the city engineer had pre-
pared plans and estimates of the work to be done. When a portion of
the bond proceeds was allocated for work not included in the engi-
neer's original plans, the claim was made that this was in violation of
the bond purposes. The court rejected this claim saying:
There is nothing in the city charter providing that the board,
before submitting a proposal for a bonded debt, shall require plans
and estimates of costs to be furnished by the engineer. The plans
and estimates of the city engineer were evidently ordered by the
board of supervisors merely for their information, and the better
to enable them to correctly estimate the cost of the proposed im-
provements .. . 128
Thus, this case is not authority for a situation in which a report is re-
quired; where it must undergo public hearings; and then be approved
by the boards of supervisors of the counties comprising a district.
It is concluded that the Sindelar court was justified in relying on
El Dorado, Clough, and by implication on Tregea, in reaching its own
decision. However, the statement which the Sindelar court derived
124. 88 Cal. at 357, 26 P. at 243.
125. Cal. Stat. 1887, ch. 34, §§ 1-47, at 29-45 (repealed in part 1943), as amended,
Cal. Stat. 1889, ch. 21, §§ 1-14, at 21-25 (repealed 1955). It was later held, however,
that an estimate of the cost could not be properly made without a plan. Cullen v.
Glendora Water Co., 113 Cal. 503, 510, 39 P. 769, aff'd on rehearing, 45 P. 822, 824,
modified, 45 P. 1047 (1896).
126. Cal. Stat. 1889, ch. 21, §§ 1-14, at 21-25 (repealed 1955).
127. 152 Cal. 311, 92 P. 859 (1907).
128. Id. at 314-15, 92 P. at 861.
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from these earlier cases, to the effect that the district is not to be bound
by engineering and feasibility reports in expending the bond pro-
ceeds,129 is much too broad to be mechanically applied to the facts of
Tooker. An examination of these earlier cases has revealed that their
fact situations are easily distinguishable. A clear distinction can be
drawn between those situations in which an engineering plan is neces-
sarily required to enable the district board to fulfill its internal func-
tion of preparing an estimate of costs, and those situations where the
plan is required by statute to fulfill the additional external functions of
providing the subject matter for a public hearing and an approval by
an independent board prior to the election. In the absence of a statu-
tory scheme for making post-election modifications, such as existed in
El Dorado, it is concluded that the act of holding the plan out to the
public, by way of a hearing and a judgment by an independent board,
should have a binding effect; i.e., the plan should become an addi-
tional element of the contract-like relationship between the voters and
the district.
Publicity and Informal Understandings
Pre-election campaign arguments and publicity have been univer-
sally held not to invalidate a bond election, even though the publicity
is false. Nor can these modify the proposition submitted to the vot-
ers.1 °  This is undoubtedly a good rule. If every false campaign ar-
gument could be used as a basis to invalidate a bond election, it is un-
likely that bonds would ever be issued. However, it is noteworthy that
even here, the cases relied upon in Sindelar on this point 3 ' all have
129. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
130. "Inducements in the way of statements and representations made to influence
a voter, although false and fraudulent, will not invalidate the election if it does not
appear that by force and fraud the voter was compelled to vote in a way he did not
desire to vote." 1 J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS 430 (5th ed. 1911).
See, e.g., Detroit United Ry..v. City of Detroit, 255 U.S. 171 (1921); El Dorado
Irrigation Dist. v. Browne, 216 Cal. 269, 13 P.2d 921 (1932); Golden Gate Bridge &
Highway Dist. v. Felt, 214 Cal. 308, 328, 5 P.2d 585, 594-95 (1931); East Bay Mu-
nicipal Util. Dist. v. Sindelar, 16 Cal. App. 3d 910, 94 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1971); Mills
v. San Francisco Bay Area -Rapid Transit Dist., 261 Cal. App. 2d 666, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 317 (1968); City of Los Angeles v. Dannenbrink, 234 Cal. App. 2d 642, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 624 (1965); Behneman v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 182 Cal. App. 2d
687, 6 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1960); Jennings v. Clearwater School Dist., 65 Cal. App. 102,
223 P. 84 (1923); Sykes v. Belk, 278 N.C. 106, 179 S.E.2d 439 (1971); Reid v. City
of Muskogee, 137 Okl. 44, 278 P. 339 (1929).
131. City of Los Angeles v. Dannenbrink, 234 Cal. App. 2d 642, 44 Cal. Rptr.
624 (1965); Bebneman v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 182 Cal. App. 2d 687,
6 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1960); Jennings v. Clearwater School Dist., 65 Cal. App. 102,
223 P. 84 (1923).
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distinguishing features. In one of these cases, the voters themselves
authorized the changed plans, 3 2 in another the ballot clearly showed
what was being voted upon, 133 and in still another an informal under-
standing was found to be of no legal effect.' 34 On this specific point,
however, Tooker relied directly on Mills,135 which can be said to have
independent weight on this issue. In any case, it does not appear nec-
essary to modify the general rule to reach a different result in Tooker.
It is true, of course, that a great deal of publicity was given the
Composite Report, but this is not determinative. The important point
is that the voters could justifiably consider that the Composite Report
was a part of the proposal submitted to them for their collective de-
cision. They should have been able to so rely in view of the elaborate
procedure required by the BART Act, especially the public hearings
and subsequent approvals by the boards of supervisors.
Suggested Remedies
This note has discussed, at some length, the law as it should be
(at least from the author's point of view) and not the law as it is. Un-
less later overruled by another case, the Tooker decision stands as the
last statement of the California courts on a confusing aspect of public
improvement bond law. Admittedly, the Tooker court would have
had to walk a thin line to get through a maze of previous cases in or-
der to reach a different decision. It has been contended here that this
could have been done. However, it is understandable that a court of
appeal would not wish to call so many Supreme Court decisions so
closely. In any event, since the courts have shown a propensity for
132. In City of Los Angeles v. Dannenbrink, 234 Cal. App. 2d 642, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 624 (1965) the question before the court related to rights of bondholders. The
voters had authorized the payment of bonds out of revenues, where originally they
had been authorized as general obligation bonds. The court said: "A system of law
which authorizes the electorate to pass upon proposed charter amendments will not
permit a court to assume that the voters did not know what they were doing when
they voted upon a specific proposal." Id. at 655, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
133. In Behneman v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 182 Cal. App. 2d 687,
6 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1960), it was claimed that the voters had been misled into believing
that the bonds would be paid off by revenue, but the court pointed out that, "the
ballots showed clearly that the bonds were not revenue bonds." Id. at 696, 6 Cal.
Rptr. at 388. Accord, Golden Gate Bridge & Highway Dist. v. Felt, 214 Cal. 308,
328, 5 P.2d 585, 594 (1931).
134. In Jennings v. Clearwater School Dist., 65 Cal. App. 102, 223 P. 84 (1923),
the claim was made that there was an informal understanding that bond proceeds were
to be used to purchase property adjoining the present school site, and not a site
some distance away. The court disallowed the claim, noting inter alia that the
electors had been called together at a public meeting for consultation on the school site
and that the electors present had approved the choice.
135. 22 Cal. App. 3d 643, 651-52, 99 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366 (1972).
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not giving binding effect to so-called engineering and feasibility re-
ports, and since it has been concluded that this can lead to manifest un-
fairness, a simple legislative remedy is proposed which could help to
clear up this confusing area of the law.
What is needed is a direct statutory statement to the effect that
the engineering or feasibility report is in fact submitted to the voters
with the bond proposition. At the same time, sufficient flexibility
must be allowed so that every minute detail of the feasibility report
does not bind the district to the point where the district board becomes
immobilized. It appears that such a happy compromise is already
available in the form of the Los Angeles County Flood Control Act.'36
This act provides for the employment of engineers for the purpose of
producing a report which includes a general description of the work to
be done, general plans and specifications, a map showing the location
of proposed work, and an estimate of the cost.137  This report is then
given to the board of supervisors (the district governing body) for its
approval.13  This procedure, so far, is similar to the BART proce-
dure. 30 The important difference comes in the requirements for sub-
mitting the bond proposition to the voters. The BART Act provides,
in pertinent part, that "[t]he resolution calling the special election shall
contain: (a) A statement of the general object and purpose of incur-
ring the indebtedness.' 40  The comparable provision of the Los An-
geles County Flood Control Act is more specific, providing that the
board of supervisors
shall call [the] special election by ordinance, and shall recite
therein the objects and purposes for which the indebtedness is
proposed to be incurred; provided, that it shall be sufficient to
give a brief general description of such objects and purposes, and
refer to the report adopted by said board of supervisors, and on
file for particulars .... 141
In a further effort to inform the voters and to make perfectly clear
what is being voted upon, this act also provides that:
Said board of supervisors shall cause so much of said report
as covers a general description of the work to be done, and the
map showing the location of the proposed work and improvements,
to be printed at least 30 days before the date fixed for such elec-
tion, and a copy thereof furnished to every qualified elector of
said district who shall apply for the same.' 42
136. CAL. WATER CODE App. § 28-1 to 28-23 (West 1968), as amended (Supp.
1972). See also id. H8 36-1 to 36-23 (Orange County Flood Control Act).
137. Id. § 28-4 (West 1968).
138. Id. § 28-5.
139. CAL. PUB. UrM. CODE §8 29151-53 (West 1965).
140. Id. § 29159.
141. CAr.. WATER CODE APP. § 28-6 (West 1968) (emphasis added).
142. Id.
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Since the order calling the election must refer directly to the report for
particulars, the courts should have no trouble in finding that the report
is binding on the district. As seen earlier, the order calling the election
forms one element of the contract-like relationship between the voters
and the district.
143
Any fear that the district will be completely immobilized by the
above provisions is adequately taken care of in another section.
Any improvement for which bonds are voted under the provisions
of this act, shall be made in conformity with the report, plans, spe-
cifications and map theretofore adopted, as above specified, un-
less the doing of any such work described in said report shall be
prohibited by law, or be rendered contrary to the best interests
of said district by some change of conditions in relation thereto,
in which event said board of supervisors may, by vote of four-
fifths of all the members thereof, order necessary changes made
in such proposed work or improvements, and may cause new
plans and specifications to be made and adopted therefor.
144
This provision of the act has been invoked successfully. In Los An-
geles County Flood Control District v. Wright14' the state refused to
approve construction of a dam, which had been planned as per the en-
gineering report submitted to the voters, on the basis that excavation
had since revealed geologic conditions which made it unsafe to pro-
ceed. The court held that this was a sufficient change in condition to
allow a change in plan, and that to follow the original plan would have
been contrary to law. 14 6
Procedures for submitting bond questions to the voters, such as
those contained in the Los Angeles County Flood Control Act would
serve to remove doubts and ambiguities, would lessen the uncertain
position of the voter, and would allow the courts to arrive at a more
just result without fear of removing the necessary degree of flexibility.
Such procedures should be adopted where the circumstances call for it.
It is here contended that the BART Act would have been better had
the legislature adopted a similar procedure.
Conclusion
The financing of needed public improvements through the issu-
ance of public bonds is a common practice, a practice with which most
voters are seemingly familar. Despite this easy familiarity, however,
the average voter is unlikely to be aware of the extent to which the
143. Jenkins v. Williams, 14 Cal. App. 89, 97, Ill P. 116, 119 (1910). See
also text accompanying notes 41-48 supra.
144. CAL. WATER CODE APP. § 28-15 (West 1968) (emphasis added).
145. 213 Cal. 335, 2 P.2d 168 (1931).
146. Id. Accord, Peacock v. Payne, 1 Cal. 2d 104, 33 P.2d 667 (1934).
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bond issuing entity can make changes in publicized plans. The voter
can be asked to vote on a bond proposition stated in general terms but,
in most cases, he can not turn to engineering and feasibility reports to
define the bond purposes more specifically. It has been suggested
here that voters can be and often are misled, not consciously, but be-
cause there is a simple lack of definition.
This note has examined the extent to which voters can be misled
through reliance on public information, especially engineering and fea-
sibility reports, published prior to public bond elections. While the
courts continue to uphold the principle of public control over public
spending, they have strictly limited the nature of the information on
which the voters may rely in exercising that control. The case of
Tooker v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District147 has been
examined in detail as an illustration of the limitations imposed by the
courts. The court could have reached a different result in Tooker by
distinguishing earlier cases and by recognizing that the BART Act is
unique. Since, however, the Tooker court continued to hold firm, a
suggested legislative remedy has been proposed which should be ap-
plied in future legislation of a similar type. Such a remedy would re-
store to the public the full measure of control to which they are en-
titled.
Raymond J. Ikola*
147. 22 Cal. App. 3d 643, 99 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1972).
* Member, Second Year Class
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